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This paper introduces a Divisia monetary aggregate for Germany
and explores its information content for the Great Recession. Divisia
money and the corresponding simple sum aggregate are highly corre-
lated in normal times but begin to diverge before the crisis. Out of
sample forecast analysis and a conditional forecast exercise show that
the predictive content of this divergence for the Great Recession is not
only statistically significant, but also economically important.
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1 Introduction
In the early years of the European Monetary Union, the European Central
Bank placed a lot of emphasis on the information content of monetary ag-
gregates. Following the tradition of Deutsche Bundesbank, the European
Central Bank even published a reference value for the growth of a broad
monetary aggregate through 2003. In view of increasing doubts concerning
the ability of monetary aggregates to provide reliable information about the
stance of monetary policy and future output, monetary aggregates almost
disappeared from monetary analysis. It was only after the onset of the finan-
cial crisis, when short-term interest rates reached their lower bound, that
the analysis of monetary aggregates regained attention.
However, monetary analysis is not restricted to monitoring the growth
of only traditional simple sum monetary aggregates. The Divisia monetary
aggregates introduced by Barnett (1980) especially stand out because they
are the optimal aggregate measure of liquidity services provided by monetary
assets with different opportunity costs. This allows Divisia aggregates to
provide additional information for monetary analysis. In particular, shifts
from one type of monetary asset into another may significantly change the
liquidity conditions of the economy and, thus, the Divisia aggregate. In
contrast, simple sum aggregates do not change even if there are large shifts
in their composition. Early evidence of superior forecasting ability of U.S.
Divisia aggregates for output relative to simple sum aggregates is provided
by Schunk (2001).
Barnett and Chauvet (2011) observe that from the 1960s to 2005, the
U.S. monetary aggregates and their Divisia counterparts diverge more during
times of high uncertainty than in times of stability. They suggest that this
divergence can be used as a signal for impending recessions. For the U.K.
Rayton and Pavlyk (2010) demonstrate that the correlation between Divisia
and simple sum monetary aggregates broke down before the start of the
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recent crisis. Our paper builds on these contributions and provides new
evidence about the information content of Divisia monetary aggregates for
the Great Recession.
To that end, we construct the Divisia M3 for Germany, the largest
economy in the Euro Area. We focus on German data because, as Bar-
nett (2003) already emphasized, constructing a Divisia index for the entire
Euro Area would require strong homogeneity assumptions throughout Euro
Area economies. In light of the heterogeneous economic development across
member countries in the aftermath of the financial crisis, analyzing country-
specific data has become even more important. This paper provides first
evidence on the predictive content of the divergence between M3 and its
Divisia counterpart for German output growth in the run-up to the Great
Recession.
Our empirical results clearly demonstrate that there is an additional in-
formation content of Divisia money for German output. First, in line with
earlier evidence found for the U.S. and the U.K. we find that M3 and its
Divisia counterpart start to diverge before the Great Recession in Germany
as well. Second, we find that output forecasts based on the divergence be-
tween M3 and Divisia M3 significantly outperform those based on a single
aggregate, either Divisia or simple sum. A conditional forecasting exercise
illustrates that the information content of the divergence is not only statis-
tically significant, but also economically important. In Germany, the crisis-
related movements in the divergence of monetary aggregates are mainly due
to significant changes in the volume of time deposits. This finding is in line
with recent evidence provided by Acharya and Mora (2015). They show
that fluctuations in both the interest rates and the quantity of time deposits
in the U.S. are caused by weak banks in the run-up to the financial crisis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe
how Divisia money is constructed for Germany and compare it with its
simple sum counterpart. Section 3 provides the out of sample forecasts
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of output growth rates for the crisis period and compares the forecasting
ability of competing models. Section 4 summarizes our findings and offers
some concluding remarks.
2 A Divisia Monetary Aggregate for Germany
2.1 Divisia Monetary Aggregates in Theory
Different components of monetary aggregates, such as cash and long-term
deposits, are characterized by very different levels of liquidity and monetary
service. Yet, in a conventional simple sum monetary aggregate cash and
long-term deposits are treated as perfect substitutes for each other. As a
consequence, the simple sum aggregate does not change even if there are
significant shifts in its composition. For example, when time deposits are
withdrawn on a large scale and completely changed into cash, the simple sum
aggregate remains unaffected while the liquidity conditions of the economy
change dramatically.
The Divisia monetary aggregate introduced by Barnett (1980) is based
on the optimization of a decision maker’s utility function subject to an ex-
penditure budget for monetary services with different user costs. Therefore,
the substitution effects that are typically ignored in the simple sum aggregate
are captured by the Divisia aggregate. Suppose the simple sum monetary
aggregate contains I different components Mi (i = 1, , , I). The growth rate
of the corresponding Divisia monetary aggregate is obtained as a weighted





where the weights w̃i are a moving average of wi =
uiMi
ΣuiMi
. ui is the
relative user cost defined as ui =
R−ri
1+R . ri is the rate of the ith component
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where the rate of cash is set to be zero. R is the benchmark rate, which
theoretically is defined as the rate of return on pure capital that provides
no liquidity services. The spread R − ri thus measures the foregone price
or opportunity cost of holding monetary asset i, which is an indicator of
its degree of liquidity. w̃iΔlnMi is the weighted contribution of the ith
component to the Divisia growth. These weighted contributions are often
used to provide more detailed information about the factors driving the
development of Divisia aggregates over time.1
If the monetary components are perfect substitutes of each other, i.e.,
if ri are identical for all i, then the Divisia money collapses to the simple
sum money. In reality, however, interest rates ri may well differ. Therefore,
the instruments are generally imperfect substitutes. The higher a monetary
component’s rate ri, the less liquid it is. When a monetary component
has less liquidity, the Divisia aggregate accounts for this by giving that
component less weight. As a consequence, changing interest-bearing time
deposits into non-interest bearing cash leads to no change in simple sum
money, but to an increase of the Divisia aggregate.
2.2 Constructing a German Divisia Index
The European Central Bank does not officially publish Divisia monetary
aggregates, either for its member countries or for the entire Euro Area. In
this subsection, we construct a M3 related Divisia monetary aggregate for
Germany in accordance with Stracca (2004) and Barnett et al. (2013).
Choosing an appropriate proxy for the benchmark rate R is the first
and foremost step in constructing Divisia money. We follow Barnett et al.
(2013) and use the interest rates of loans to non-financial corporations with
a maturity up to one year as the proxy for the benchmark rate.2 This short-
1Weighted contributions of US Divisia monetary aggregates are reported on a monthly
basis by the Center for Financial Stability.
2The Bank of Israel also uses this type of short-term loan rate for computation of their
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term loan rate is always greater than the interest rates on deposits, since a
bank will not pay out to depositors more than it earns on short-term loans.
We break down M3 into five components: (i) currency in circulation, (ii)
overnight deposits, (iii) deposits redeemable at three months’ notice, (iv)
time deposits with maturity up to two years, and (v) marketable instru-
ments. Seasonally adjusted monthly observations of quantities of German
monetary assets are obtained from the website of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank. The only exception refers to currency circulated in Germany because
the outstanding amount of currency can be only observed for the whole Euro
Area. The proxy for currency circulated in Germany is the one published
by ECB. Accordingly, it is defined as the total currency in the Euro System
multiplied by the share of the European Central Bank’s capital belonging
to the Deutsche Bundesbank.
The interest rate data are taken from the MFI interest rate statistics
set out in Regulation ECB/2001/18, see Figure 5 in the appendix. MFI
interest-rate statistics are available from 2003 onwards. Accordingly, our
sample period runs from January 2003 up to July 2014. Rates of return
to marketable instruments are represented by the short-term money market
rates, see Stracca (2004). More details about the data used in the construc-
tion of Divisia M3 are provided in Table 3 in the Appendix.
Figure 1 shows the annual growth rates of the Divisia M3, the simple
sum M3 and the divergence between the two series. Note that the growth
rate of M3 starts to rise faster than the Divisia M3 before the crisis. In fact,
the greatest difference between the two occurs just before the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers. After the outbreak of crisis, the divergence shifts
to negative values because growth of Divisia M3 became significantly larger
than M3 growth. Interestingly, the behavior of the German Divisia aggregate
is in line with Barnett and Chauvet (2011), which point out that the U.S.
simple sum monetary aggregates and their Divisia counterparts diverge the
Divisia monetary aggregates, see Offenbacher and Shachar (2011).
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Notes: Annual growth rates of the Divisia M3, the simple sum M3 and their di-
vergence for Germany. The divergence is the largest right before the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers.
most around recessions.
2.3 What Drives the Divergence Between M3 and its Divisia
Counterpart?
Why did M3 and Divisia M3 start diverging before the crisis? Figure 2
depicts weighted contributions of the five monetary components to Divisia
M3 growth. It is striking that the share contributed by time deposits has
experienced accelerating growth before the crisis. In 2007, the growth rate of
the time deposits’ contribution increased dramatically, in contrast to little
growth or a slight decrease in the other types of monetary assets. After
the default of Lehman Brothers, the time deposits’ contribution fell sharply.
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Notes: The weighted contribution of the ith monetary asset is w̃iΔlnMi, see Eq. 1.
The weighted contribution of deposits up to two years to Divisia M3 growth kept rising
until the Lehman’s bankruptcy and fell sharply afterwards.
Both the magnitude and timing of the turning points of the time deposits’
contribution match well with those of the divergence between M3 and Divisia
M3 shown in Figure 1.
In order to illustrate the effects of the weighting scheme on the diver-
gence between Divisia M3 and M3, consider the following simple numerical
example. Suppose in the simple sum aggregate, each of the five monetary
components is given the same weight, 20%. Suppose further that in the
Divisia monetary aggregate, time deposits are given a weight of only 10%
because of their lower opportunity cost.3 As a result, a 40% growth in time
deposits leads to a 8% (0.2× 40%) rise in the simple sum growth, but only
3Figure 6 in the appendix depicts the actual weight of each monetary component used
for the construction of the Divisia index.
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a 4% (0.1 × 40%) rise in the Divisia money growth. The strong growth
of time deposits has a more dramatic impact on the simple sum aggregate
because the lower liquidity of time deposits is not appropriately accounted
for. Before the crisis, this effect was further amplified by the increase in the
interest rate for time deposits, see Figure 3.
A possible explanation for the rapid growth of time deposits before the
Lehman bankruptcy and the subsequent sharp fall has been recently pro-
posed by Acharya and Mora (2015). Investigating the deposit rates and
inflows during the crisis periods in the U.S. they found that banks that are
weak and short of liquidity tended to offer high rates in order to attract
deposits, especially when competition for deposits was intense.


















Notes: The interest rate (right scale) and the annual growth rate (left scale) of
the volume of deposits with maturity up to 2 years in Germany. Source: Deutsche
Bundesbank.
Before the outbreak of the crisis, Germany was the second largest source
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of asset-backed securities (ABS) next to the US. In 2007, when ABS was no
longer highly rated, some German financial institutions also faced a liquid-
ity shortage. Figure 3 shows that the interest rate of time deposits kept
rising to as high as almost 4.5% by the end of 2008. The annual growth
rate of time deposits in Germany peaked up to 46% just before the Lehman
Bankruptcy. This pattern was reversed in the subsequent months and bot-
tomed out at minus 53% in November 2009. Therefore, the soaring growth
of time deposits in Germany might have also be related to fundamentally
weak banks actively seeking deposits to meet their liquidity needs.
3 Forecasting Output Growth in the Great Reces-
sion With Monetary Statistics
3.1 Out of Sample Forecasts
In this section, we investigate the information content of M3, Divisia M3
and their divergence using an out-of-sample forecasting exercise for German
output growth. Following Barnett and Chauvet (2011), the focus of the
analysis is on whether monetary statistics could have been used as a signal
for the Great Recession. Therefore, all forecasting models are estimated
using pre-crisis data only. Specifically, the estimation period ends in Au-
gust 2008, right before the Lehman breakdown. The resulting forecasts are
evaluated for the subsequent crisis-related period of economic turbulence.
In Germany, a plausible ending point of the Great Recession and the cor-
responding recovery period is December 2010, but our main results are not
affected by that choice.4
Following Schunk (2001) , we base our analysis on VAR models including
4Note that a forecast comparison of M3 and Divisia M3 for longer periods is less
interesting because the growth of M3 and Divisia M3 is very similar in these normal
times, see Figure 1.
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the monetary statistic under consideration and monthly data for the annual
growth rate of industrial production, the common proxy for output growth.
For each of the three monetary statistics under consideration, the lag-length
of the VAR is three, as selected by the AIC criterion.5
Table 1: MSE of forecast errors for output during the Great Recession
Divisia Model M3 Model Divergence Model
3 month ahead 0.188 0.153 0.125
4 month ahead 0.280 0.232 0.181
5 month ahead 0.350 0.286 0.224
6 month ahead 0.363 0.295 0.225
Notes: The table shows the MSE of forecast errors for German output growth. Fore-
casts are based on VARs estimated over the pre-crisis period including output growth
and one of the following monetary statistics: M3, Divisia M3, and their Divergence.
The out-of-sample period (2008M09 -2010M12) consists of 28 month which allows us
to evaluate 23 rounds of output forecasts for each horizon.
We evaluate the forecast ability of monetary statistics and the corre-
sponding VARs based on the mean squared error (MSE) of forecasts from
3 to 6 month ahead. Table 1 summarizes the results of the out-of-sample
forecasting exercise. Apparently, confirming the conjecture of Barnett and
Chauvet (2011), the Divergence Model estimated for Germany outperforms
its competitors for all forecasting horizons.6 However, in contrast to Schunk
(2001), our results do not indicate a superior forecasting ability of the pure
5KPSS tests confirm that the forecasting models are stationary over the sample period.
For brevity, results of KPSS tests and further diagnostics of the estimated VARs are not
presented but are available on request.
6For sake of completeness, we also compare the forecasting performance of the mon-
etary models to a benchmark AR model. The results show that the Divergence Model
outperforms the AR model for longer horizons.
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Divisia index. In fact, irrespective of the forecasting horizon, the second best
forecasting model is the VAR based on M3, i.e., the simple sum aggregate.
3.2 Forecast Accuracy Tests
Let us now investigate whether the superior information content of the Di-
vergence Model suggested in Table 1 is also statistically significant. To this
end, we employ the forecast accuracy test proposed by Diebold and Mariano
(1995) that has become a standard tool to compare the forecasting ability
of non-nested models. The DM-test statistic is based on the loss differential
dt = e
2
1,t − e22,t, where e1,t and e2,t are the forecast errors of the two models






where the numerator d̄ is the mean of the loss differential. The denomina-
tor stands for the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC)
variance estimator by Newey andWest (1994), which uses the Bartlett kernel
and a data-determined bandwidth. Under the null of equal forecast accuracy
the DM statistic is asymptotically normally distributed. However, empirical
applications of the DM-test may suffer from a small sample bias. Therefore,
we also apply the modified DM test proposed by Harvey et al. (1997). This
modified DM test differs from the original DM test in two ways. First, the
DM test statistics is adjusted by
√
T+1−2h+h(h−1)/T
T , where T = 23 denotes
the number of forecast errors, and h = 3, 4, 5, 6 is the forecasting horizon.
Second, the statistic is compared to the critical values from a Student’s t dis-
tribution rather than a normal distribution. As confirmed by Clark (1999),
the modified DM test suffers relatively small size distortions in small sam-
ples compared against the DM test and several other competing tests with
HAC variance estimators.
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Table 2: Tests of equal predictive accuracy between the M3 Model and the
Divergence Model
the DM test the modified DM test
3 month ahead 3.142∗∗∗ 2.787∗∗∗
4 month ahead 2.359∗∗ 1.984∗
5 month ahead 3.186∗∗∗ 2.533∗∗∗
6 month ahead 2.907∗∗∗ 2.179∗∗∗
Notes: This table presents test results on H0: forecast errors from the Simple sum
Model and the Divergence Model are equal. Forecasting periods cover from September
2008 to December 2010. ∗significant at the 10% level , ∗∗ significant at the 5% level,
∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
Table 2 presents the results from both version of the DM tests applied to
the M3 Model and the Divergence Model. For all forecast horizons, the null
hypothesis of equal forecasting accuracy is rejected by the DM test at either
1% significance level or 5% significance level. After small sample correction,
the modified DM test results still show rejection of the null hypothesis at
1% significance level for most forecast horizons. Overall, forecast accuracy
tests provide strong evidence that the forecasts from the Divergence Model
outperform those from the M3 Model during the Great Recession and the
subsequent recovery period.
3.3 Conditional Forecasts
In order to shed more light on the economic relevance of the additional
information content of the divergence relative to M3, we also conduct a con-
ditional forecasting exercise for output growth. The forecasts are conditional
in the sense that they are generated using the observed values rather than
the estimated values of monetary statistics.
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Notes: Conditional forecasts of German output growth are based on the bivariate
VAR models estimated in Section 3.1.
Figure 4 presents the conditional forecasts of output growth from the Di-
vergence Model and the M3 Model. Forecasting the downturn in industrial
production in the Great Recession is clearly more reliable using the informa-
tion gleaned from the divergence between M3 and Divisia M3. In contrast to
the divergence variable, the simple sum monetary aggregate did not signal
the severe downturn of the German economy stirred by the Lehman break-
down. Conditional forecasts of output growth obtained from the Divergence
Model are also more accurate during the subsequent recovery period.
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4 Conclusion
This paper re-investigates the role of money for output during the Great
Recession period. In addition to the conventional simple sum monetary ag-
gregates, we consider the theory-founded Divisia monetary aggregate pro-
posed by Barnett (1980). Confirming earlier evidence from the U.S. and
the U.K. we find that the German M3 and its Divisia counterpart behave
quite differently around the Great Recession. This difference is most clearly
seen in the volatile growth of deposits with up to 2 years maturity. As ar-
gued by Acharya and Mora (2015), volatile fluctuations in both the interest
rates of time deposits and the growth of the quantity of time deposits might
be related to weak banks actively seeking deposits when facing a liquidity
shortage.
Our quantitative analysis indicates that forecasts of German output
growth during the Great Recession and the subsequent recovery period are
the most accurate when using a model that includes the information con-
tained in the divergence between Divisia money and simple sum money.
This confirms the findings of Barnett and Chauvet (2011) who suggest that
this divergence is able to signal U.S. recessions. Our results suggest that the
information content of money can be restored if monetary analysis is not re-
stricted to the traditional simple sum monetary aggregates, but is expanded
to include Divisia monetary aggregates as well.
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Table 3: Sources of monetary time series
code source
Currency in circulation BDTXI300A Datastream
Overnight deposit (total) BBK01.TSD304 Deutsche Bundesbank
Overnight deposit (volume from house-
hold)
BBK01.SUD201 Deutsche Bundesbank
Overnight deposit (interest rate for house-
hold)
BBK01.SUD101 Deutsche Bundesbank
Overnight deposit (volume from non-
financial corporations)
BBK01.SUD207 Deutsche Bundesbank
Overnight deposit (interest rate for non-
financial corporations)
BBK01.SUD107 Deutsche Bundesbank
Deposits redeemable at 3 months’ notice BBK01.TSD306 Deutsche Bundesbank
Interest rate on deposits redeemable at 3
months’ notice
BBK01.SUD105 Deutsche Bundesbank
Deposits with up to 2 years maturity (to-
tal)
BBK01.TSD305 Deutsche Bundesbank
Deposits with up to 2 years maturity (vol-
ume from household)
BBK01.SUD021 Deutsche Bundesbank
Deposits with up to 2 years maturity (in-
terest rate for household)
BBK01.SUD001 Deutsche Bundesbank
Deposits with up to 2 years maturity (vol-
ume from non-financial corporations)
BBK01.SUD023 Deutsche Bundesbank
Deposits with up to 2 years maturity (in-
terest rate for non-financial corporations)
BBK01.SUD003 Deutsche Bundesbank
Marketable instruments BBK01.TS5379O Deutsche Bundesbank
EURIBOR three-month BBK01.SU0316 Deutsche Bundesbank
Rate on loans to non-financial corporations
up to 1 year
BBK01.SUD012 Deutsche Bundesbank
Notes: All volume data are seasonally adjusted by the Deutsche Bundesbank except for cash, where
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